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  1. Front Matter
    Front Matter (pp. [i]-[iv])
    https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt1df4h8c.1
    https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1df4h8c.1
  2. Table of Contents
    Table of Contents (pp. v-vi)
    https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt1df4h8c.2
    https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1df4h8c.2
  3. Introduction
    Introduction (pp. 1-4)
    Steven W. Hook and Tim Niblock
    https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt1df4h8c.3
    https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1df4h8c.3

    Security issues in the Gulf region have been of critical importance to global stability over a prolonged period. Seldom, however, have they reached as critical a turning-point as they have now. Three factors account for their current salience. First, shifts in the demand for Gulf oil have transformed the Gulf’s economic relationships with outside countries. Rapidly increasing demand from Asian countries (especially China and India), declining demand from the United States and a static level of demand from the European Union, have propelled China and India into the positions of the Gulf’s first and third largest trading partners. Second, developments...

  4. Strategic Economic Relationships and Strategic Openings in the Gulf
    1 Strategic Economic Relationships and Strategic Openings in the Gulf (pp. 5-22)
    Tim Niblock
    https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt1df4h8c.4
    https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1df4h8c.4

    This chapter seeks to provide an overarching view of how economic factors are transforming the Gulf ’ s relationship with the rest of the world, and assesses whether this creates the basis for new strategic alignments. The possibilities and implications of a changing US role in the Gulf, therefore, will be placed in the context of ongoing changes in the relationships between Asian powers and the Gulf states. Particular emphasis will be given to the role of China.

    The chapter will begin by distinguishing between different meanings of “strategic”, suggesting that the Chinese (and perhaps wider Asian) understanding of a...

  5. Hegemonic Stability and American Power
    2 Hegemonic Stability and American Power (pp. 23-40)
    Steven W. Hook
    https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt1df4h8c.5
    https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1df4h8c.5

    The defining feature of the global balance of power since World War II has been the predominance of the United States in the global balance of power. In contrast to other great powers, the United States emerged from the war stronger militarily and economically. With economic output in 1946 greater than all other countries combined, American leaders adopted a grand strategy of sustained primacy whose aim was to extend the unipolar era far into the future.

    This strategy was directly linked to three broad tactics of US foreign policy. The first focused on rebuilding Western economies and creating the foundations...

  6. Arabia to Asia: The Myths and Merits of an American “Pivot”
    3 Arabia to Asia: The Myths and Merits of an American “Pivot” (pp. 41-60)
    John Duke Anthony
    https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt1df4h8c.6
    https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1df4h8c.6

    That the foreign policies of various governments often appear to be contradictory is because they frequently are. Certainly of late, this seems to characterize aspects of America’s relations with the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. This ambiguity and the confusion and uncertainty that accompany it are among the things that President Barack Obama sought to dispel and clarify in the course of his March 2014 visit to Saudi Arabia. As this chapter seeks to demonstrate, what he had to contend with in terms of background, context, and perspective...

  7. The Evolving American Security Role in the Gulf
    4 The Evolving American Security Role in the Gulf (pp. 61-77)
    David B. Des Roches
    https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt1df4h8c.7
    https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1df4h8c.7

    The American role in the Gulf region is easily misinterpreted. The strategic interests of the United States in the region remain constant, but its operational presence will inevitably decrease. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that a decrease in physical presence indicates a correlating decrease in strategic relevance. An examination of the US military posture will show that there is no strategic decrease in the US ability to achieve its security goals in the Gulf. Indeed, one can make a strong case that the decrease in American day-today military presence increases the possibility of extraordinary American military actions...

  8. The Eagle’s Nest in the Gulf: Analysis of US Military Deployment in the GCC Countries (1991-2014)
    5 The Eagle’s Nest in the Gulf: Analysis of US Military Deployment in the GCC Countries (1991-2014) (pp. 78-96)
    Degang Sun and Yahia H. Zoubir
    https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt1df4h8c.8
    https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1df4h8c.8

    After the end of the Gulf War in 1991, US military deployments in the GCC states were transformed from aiming solely at the containment of Iran to the dual containment of both Iran and Iraq.² In the light of the 9/11 2001 terrorist attacks, the US further readjusted its military presence in the GCC states in two respects. First, the task of the bases evolved from dual containment to the more complex and enduring tasks of safeguarding Gulf security, countering terrorists, and containing Iran. Second, the major military base distribution shifted from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to Qatar, Bahrain and...

  9. The Future of a Critical US Relationship in the Gulf: US-Saudi Relations and the Rise of the Saudi “Garrison State”
    6 The Future of a Critical US Relationship in the Gulf: US-Saudi Relations and the Rise of the Saudi “Garrison State” (pp. 97-114)
    Mohammed Turki Al-Sudairi
    https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt1df4h8c.9
    https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1df4h8c.9

    The future of the US presence in the Gulf will inevitably be dependent on how it relates to the leading powers of the Gulf. Saudi Arabia is of key importance here. This chapter aims to provide readers with a general overview of the state of the US-Saudi relationship, and its sustainability over the long-run. It argues that the traditional strategic basis for the US-Saudi relationship is eroding, but structural and geostrategic impediments, continued utility and mutual benefit as well short-term reinforcing factors are sustaining it for the time being. The next decade or two should be construed as a transitional...

  10. America’s Monetary Stake in the Gulf and the Looming Challenge of the Petroyuan
    7 America’s Monetary Stake in the Gulf and the Looming Challenge of the Petroyuan (pp. 115-131)
    Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett
    https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt1df4h8c.10
    https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1df4h8c.10

    Thinking clearly about the future of US commitments and alignments in the Persian Gulf requires appreciation of America’s monetary stake in this critical part of the world. That stake is embodied most saliently in a strategically vital link between the dollar and international oil trading.

    Since World War II, America’s geopolitical supremacy has rested not only on military preponderance, but also on two critical geoeconomic foundations. One has been the ability to exercise dispositive strategic influence over the security, production, and marketing of Persian Gulf hydrocarbons. From its origins in World War II, US interest in Gulf oil has never...

  11. Emerging Dynamics of US-Gulf Engagement: India’s Policy Options
    8 Emerging Dynamics of US-Gulf Engagement: India’s Policy Options (pp. 132-150)
    Girijesh Pant
    https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt1df4h8c.11
    https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1df4h8c.11

    The subtle but defined shift in US –GCC engagement triggered by the ramifications of the Arab uprisings experienced an unexpected twist on 29 June 2014 when, out of the fumes of the regional conflict, emerged the Islamic State with ISIS leader Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi as Caliph. The declaration transformed the security–stability matrix by placing political Islam and terrorism as the defining parameters, thus posing a challenge to the political authority of those whose rule is based on their Islamic legitimacy. The Gulf regimes saw this as primarily an ideological threat to their existence, rather than a simple matter of...

  12. The European Union in the Gulf: New Opportunities for Cooperation
    9 The European Union in the Gulf: New Opportunities for Cooperation (pp. 151-167)
    Cinzia Bianco
    https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt1df4h8c.12
    https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1df4h8c.12

    The relationship between the United States (US) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries has been described as a Catholic marriage: one in which, no matter the strains you go through, for the greater good, there is no divorce.¹ Since the 1990s, when the US started functioning as the offshore balancer in the peninsula’s power struggles, the relationship has survived several strategic threats, including the 2003 Iraq War and its destabilizing consequences. However, events that took place under Barack Obama’s presidency suggested the idea that the United States was willing to re-evaluate its role in the Middle East and North...

  13. On the Right Side of History?: US Transitions and the Possibilities of a British Strategic Role in the Gulf
    10 On the Right Side of History?: US Transitions and the Possibilities of a British Strategic Role in the Gulf (pp. 168-191)
    Saul Kelly and Gareth Stansfield
    https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt1df4h8c.13
    https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1df4h8c.13

    The debate concerning the intentions of the US government towards the Gulf, particularly in the realm of security provision and the maintaining of defence arrangements with key Gulf allies, has received considerable attention from academics. Some view the US ‘pivot to Asia’, which was referred to by President Barak Obama as a ‘rebalancing’, as a strategy that will see the US security footprint in the Gulf diminish. Others have contended the very opposite – that the rebalancing of US attention to the Far East will actually strengthen the US commitment to securing the Gulf, because of the inherent geopolitical value of...

  14. About the Contributors
    About the Contributors (pp. 192-195)
    https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt1df4h8c.14
    https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1df4h8c.14